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RESUMEN 
En este artículo defiendo una versión del contextualismo wittgensteiniano. Se 
trata de un punto de vista sobre la justificación de acuerdo con el cual algunas creen-
cias son epistémicamente apropiadas puesto que no puede aducirse evidencia a su fa-
vor. Rastreo la historia de este punto de vista desde Wittgenstein y Ortega hasta la 
actualidad, defiendo una versión suya de la acusación de relativismo y sugiero algunas 
aplicaciones suyas dentro y fuera de la filosofía. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a 
view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because 
evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Witt-
genstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativ-
ism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy. 
 
KEYWORDS: Justification, Evidence, Wittgensteinian Contextualism, Hinge Epistemology, 
Relativism. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What makes a belief justified? There is little consensus on the 
answer to this question amongst contemporary epistemologists. Some 
think that a subject must have, and be able to cite, evidence or reasons 
in order for her belief to be justified; others think that features of her 
epistemic position which are not accessible by her are more important. 
One position which has received relatively little attention is that in-
spired by Wittgenstein. According to this view, not only can some be-
liefs be justified in spite of the fact that no evidence or reasons can be 
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adduced in their favour, but there is a sense in which some beliefs are 
justified specifically because no evidence or reasons can be adduced 
in their favour. My goal in this paper is to explain and defend a partic-
ular, contextualist version of this view. 
Let’s start by outlining some more common views of justifica-
tion. A very general way of characterising epistemic justification is to 
say that a proposition is justified for a subject if the basis the subject 
has for that proposition makes her belief in it in some way epistemi-
cally appropriate.
1
 This epistemic propriety is what separates mere 
true belief from knowledge. There are various ways of cashing out ep-
istemic propriety; for example both the heights of the standards of 
propriety can vary,
2
 as can what is considered capable of meeting 
these standards,
3
 but the general characterisation is uncontroversial. 
Two senses of epistemic propriety will be useful for our purposes. 
The first I’ll call ‘subjective rational support’: 
 
SUBJECTIVE RATIONAL SUPPORT: A proposition P is epistemically 
appropriate for subject S when S believes P on a basis which 
provides her with rational support – that is, it provides her with 
reasons or evidence which she can (or could, with sufficient re-
flection) adduce in favour of her belief.  
 
The idea here is that epistemic propriety is connected to what it is ra-
tional for us to believe given our epistemic position.
4
 Part of the ap-
peal of basing justification on this understanding of epistemic 
propriety is that it requires the subject to be able to respond to chal-
lenges to her belief. Say I flick a phrase book open, pick a sentence at 
random and for no particular reason form a belief in the proposition 
that the sentence expresses. I now believe “The nearest train station is 
north of the town hall”. If someone challenges this belief, by suggest-
ing that the nearest station might in fact be south of the town hall, then 
I have nothing at my disposal with which to respond, even if the prop-
osition is true. I can point out that the sentence expressing this propo-
sition was in the phrasebook but, as I don’t have any reason to think 
that the propositions in the phrase book are true, this does nothing to 
respond to the challenge.
5
 Intuitively this seems like the right result – I 
am not justified in believing this proposition. 
Compare my spontaneous phrasebook belief to that of someone 
who forms the same belief after looking at a map. This subject is able 
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to respond to challenges by adducing reasons in favour of her belief 
(she could say, for example: “local maps generally represent the rela-
tive locations of nearby landmarks accurately”, and so on), and so for 
her the proposition is justified. Again, this seems like the right result. 
However, there are cases where requiring a subject to be able to 
respond to challenges seems overly-demanding. There are subjects 
who are not inclined to reflect on their reasons for belief, or who are 
incapable of doing so (for example young children, or otherwise ‘un-
sophisticated’ subjects), and it’s not difficult to imagine that there are 
some domains in which almost all subjects will be unable to adduce 
reasons for their beliefs.
6
 Yet we intuitively want to attribute knowledge 
in these cases, and so (assuming that knowledge requires justification) 
we must think that these subjects are justified. 
The second understanding of epistemic propriety avoids this 
problem. I’ll call it ‘truth-conducive support’: 
 
TRUTH-CONDUCIVE SUPPORT: A proposition P is epistemically 
appropriate for subject S when S believes P on a basis which is 
truth-conducive – that is, on a basis which is likely to lead her to 
form true beliefs. 
 
On this understanding epistemic propriety isn’t ultimately concerned 
with our epistemic perspective, but rather is primarily concerned with 
epistemic success, even when this isn’t reflected in our epistemic per-
spective.
7
 Since the chance of a subject’s epistemic success can plau-
sibly be thought to increase with the reliability of her basis, even if she 
isn’t aware of how reliable her basis is, then a belief which merely has 
such a basis can be justified. This means that as long as young chil-
dren use generally reliable (or otherwise truth-conducive) belief-
forming processes then their beliefs will be epistemically appropriate, 
and therefore justified, even if they are unable to access or articulate 
any reasons for them. 
The characterisations I offer here are only rough sketches (in-
deed, they may be closer to caricatures), but will serve well enough as 
a background against which we can explain the view this paper is con-
cerned with. So far we have two, broad conceptions of justification 
which are in competition, and each has the theoretical benefit of re-
specting one of our intuitions; justification requiring subjective ration-
al support looks plausible because we have the intuition that subjects 
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should be able to respond to challenges about their justified beliefs, 
whilst justification which merely requires truth-conduciveness looks 
plausible because it acknowledges that there are intuitive cases of jus-
tified belief where this isn’t possible. 
The conception of justification that I will defend operates within 
a space which these two views share. It will respect the intuition be-
hind subjective rational support by requiring that subjects be able to 
respond to legitimate challenges to their beliefs, but will borrow from 
the motivation for truth-conducive rational support by denying that 
this always requires reasons to be adduced.
8
 
This conception of justification has its roots in Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty. In section 1 I’ll begin by sketching out these roots. I’ll then 
trace the history of the development of this conception in section 2, 
before pulling out the key features of the view we’ll focus on in sec-
tion 3. In section 4 I’ll introduce some objections to this view, and ex-
plore the possibilities for response. In section 5 I’ll develop a 
‘cautious’ strategy to the most pressing objection to Wittgensteinian 
contextualism by arguing for two crucial additions to the view. Finally 
I’ll conclude in section 6 by pointing towards some areas both within 
and without philosophy which could benefit from the adoption of 
Wittgensteinian contextualism. 
 
 
I. WITTGENSTEINIAN ROOTS 
 
The picture we are interested in has its roots in Wittgenstein’s fi-
nal notebooks, which were compiled in On Certainty. In this, Witt-
genstein uses some innocuous observations about (subjective) rational 
support to make two, more startling, claims about justification. The 
first observation is that any basis that a subject offers in rational sup-
port of a proposition she believes must be more certain for her (or, the 
degree of confidence she has in it must be greater) than the proposi-
tion it supports. Call this the ‘initial insight’: 
 
INITIAL INSIGHT: For a proposition P1 to rationally support an-
other proposition P2, the degree of confidence the relevant sub-
ject has in P1 must be greater than the degree of confidence the 
relevant subject has in P2. 
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Imagine a subject attempting to support her belief in the proposition 
that she has two hands with the proposition that she sees them both 
before her. Something seems off about this, and Wittgenstein claims 
that it is a failure to acknowledge the initial insight. It’s not clear 
which of the two propositions the subject has the greater degree of 
confidence in, and so it’s not clear that she shouldn’t instead test her 
eyes by looking to see whether she sees her two hands [Wittgenstein 
(1969), §125; §250]. The initial insight explains this oddness in a 
plausible way. 
With this initial insight in place, something surprising follows; 
our most certain beliefs (those we have the greatest degree of confi-
dence in) have no rational support. This is because, as we have 
acknowledged, (1) rational support for a particular proposition must 
inspire a greater degree of confidence than the proposition itself, but 
(2) by definition there are no propositions which inspire a greater de-
gree of confidence than our most certain beliefs, and so it follows that 
(3) there are no propositions which could rationally support our most 
certain beliefs. We’ll refer to this conclusion as ‘lack of support’: 
 
LACK OF SUPPORT: A belief in proposition P which is optimally-
certain cannot be rationally-supported. 
 
The second observation is emphasised by Duncan Pritchard 
(forthcominga, forthcomingb): any basis offered as rational grounds (or 
subjective reason) for doubting a proposition must inspire a greater 
degree of confidence than the proposition it calls into doubt. We can 
call this the Implicit Insight: 
 
IMPLICIT INSIGHT: For a proposition P1 to offer rational grounds 
for doubt of another proposition P2, P1 must inspire a greater de-
gree of confidence than P2. 
 
This point is controversial – sceptical hypotheses, for example, operate 
on the assumption that all one need do to raise a sceptical doubt about 
those propositions which we have the greatest degree of confidence in is 
to point out the possibility of a contradictory scenario obtaining. This 
contradictory scenario needn’t inspire a greater degree of confidence 
than the target proposition in order to provoke doubt, and in fact these 
scenarios are usually very far-fetched, and so are unlikely to inspire 
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much confidence at all. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein seems to rely on this 
insight, and others have defended this move in more detail.
9
 
If we accept the implicit insight we can construct an argument 
similar to the one that utilises the initial insight. This time, as (1) ra-
tional grounds for doubting a particular proposition must inspire a 
greater degree of confidence than the proposition itself, and (2) by 
definition there are no propositions which inspire greater confidence 
than our most certain propositions, it follows that (3) there are no 
propositions which could rationally ground doubt in our most certain 
beliefs. Let’s call this ‘lack of doubt’: 
 
LACK OF DOUBT: A belief in proposition P which is optimally-
certain cannot be rationally doubted. 
 
The moral Wittgenstein takes from these points is that the practice of 
rational evaluation is necessarily limited. Not everything can be justi-
fied and not everything can be questioned, but this isn’t due to psy-
chological discomfort or the limits of human cognition. Rather, it’s 
just a fact about rational justification (or epistemic propriety) that 
some propositions are beyond support or doubt. As Wittgenstein puts 
it; “[I]t isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate 
everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with as-
sumption”, rather it is part of the very logic of justification that some, 
optimally-certain propositions (now often referred to as ‘hinge propo-
sitions’) must remain fixed; “[i]f I want the door to turn, the hinges 
must stay put” [Wittgenstein (1969) §343]. The result of this is that 
some beliefs are epistemically appropriate specifically because they 
cannot have evidence adduced in their favour.  
The work of José Ortega y Gasset sheds further light on this idea. 
Ortega (2002), pp. 178-9, makes a distinction between two kinds of 
beliefs, which he calls ‘IDEAS’ and ‘BELIEFS’. BELIEFS (sometimes 
‘ideas-beliefs’) are those beliefs which are not arrived at through in-
ference, but instead “form the container of our lives”. He describes 
them as being our most “radical” beliefs, by which he means they are 
so integral to our thinking and our understanding that they can’t be 
questioned or supported. Rather, he says they support us, as we “count 
on them, always, without interruption”. 
This corroborates Wittgenstein’s claim that certain (hinge-like) 
propositions are subject to Lack of Support and Lack of Doubt, and 
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makes it clearer that this idea isn’t epistemically problematic. These 
propositions aren’t merely unsupported, but are necessarily unsup-
portable because of the integral supporting role that they play. 
In contrast, Ortega talks about IDEAS (or ideas-occurrences) 
which we “come upon”, by discovering or inferring them. On the 
Wittgensteinian picture these would be non-hinge propositions. Be-
cause there is a clear period during which we don’t have these beliefs 
(the period up until we discover or infer them), we don’t rely on them 
to border rational evaluation, and so are in a position to support and 
question them. As we will see, the theme of this contrast has been 
picked up by a number of authors since Wittgenstein and Ortega, and 
has the potential to allow for progress in a number of areas of episte-
mology, as well as other areas both within and without philosophy. 
The stage is now set for the alternative conception of justification 
that I will defend. Although this conception can still be called a mi-
nority view, some epistemologists have seen merit in it, and have at-
tempted to develop it further. In the next section I’ll explore some of 
these attempts to develop Wittgenstein’s view, and draw out some 
common threads running through them, before arguing that we can, 
and should, follow Wittgenstein’s lead. 
 
 
II. TRACING THE PICTURE’S DEVELOPMENT 
 
A key step in the development of this view is the move towards 
making it contextualist. Most basically this idea is that which proposi-
tions are optimally-certain, and so act as the limits on rational evalua-
tion, is a function of some contextually-sensitive factor. The first, and 
most concise, defence of this view comes from David Annis (1978), 
who cites On Certainty as an example of a text which contains early 
hints towards a contextualist theory. 
In contrast with the prevailing views at the time, Annis argued 
that whether or not a speaker is justified in believing a proposition de-
pends on whether or not they are able to meet appropriate objections 
to it.
10
 The contextualist aspect is in what determines whether an ob-
jection is appropriate and thus needs to be responded to. According to 
Annis “[f]or S to be held accountable for answering an objection, [and 
thus for the objection to pose a threat to justification] it must be a 
manifestation of a real doubt where the doubt is occasioned by a real 
life situation”. 
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Understanding what ‘situation’ the subject is in will be important 
then. Annis refers to this as the subject’s issue context, and in explain-
ing this idea refers to a number of factors; the social position occupied 
by the subject (eg. that of a medical student compared to that of a lay-
person), the importance attached to correctly handling objections (say 
in medical trials on animals and in those on humans), and the relevant 
‘objector-group’ (made up of those attributing and withholding justifi-
cation to and from the subject). 
It seems plausible that different subjects in these different con-
texts could be equally justified, despite being able to only to respond 
to some (varying) subset of challenges to the believed proposition. 
Here we can see how this conception of justification might be able to 
draw out common ground between the two conceptions already con-
sidered. The requirement that subjects be able to respond to at least 
some challenges goes someway to respecting the intuition behind jus-
tification based on subjective rational support, whilst the acknowl-
edgement that some subjects might not have to meet all challenges 
plays up to the intuition that a stronger requirement would be overly-
demanding. 
At this point it’s worth noting a view that shares some similari-
ties with the idea we are developing. Fred Dretske’s (1970) theory of 
relevant alternatives is another way to spell out the difference between 
answering all challenges and just some important sub-set. Rather than 
focusing on challenges which are situationally appropriate, however, it 
focuses on those which are relevant.
11
 
Traditionally, it was thought that if a subject knew a proposition 
P she must also know that all alternatives that entail ¬P are false. But, 
as Dretske [(1970), pp. 1015-6] claims, such a condition is rarely met. 
In his famous example an ordinary subject on an ordinary day out at 
the zoo claims to know that the animal in the pen in front of her is a 
zebra. However, the subject doesn’t know that the animal before her 
isn’t a cleverly-disguised mule, and so on the traditional view she 
doesn’t know that it is a zebra. 
This is a counter-intuitive result. One way to avoid it is to modify 
the traditional understanding of knowledge; instead of entailing that 
the denials of all alternatives are known, perhaps knowledge only en-
tails that the subject knows the denial of all relevant alternatives 
[Dretske (1981), p. 367]. This view lends itself readily to a contextual-
ist interpretation of knowledge – what counts as ‘relevant’ could, of 
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course, be sensitive to context. On an ordinary day out at the zoo the 
cleverly-disguised mule alternative isn’t relevant, but if the subject is 
a zoo-inspector charged with ensuring that the zoo authorities are not 
misleading the public then the cleverly-disguised mule alternative is 
relevant. 
Although on the surface this view is compatible with Wittgenstein-
ian contextualism, and so stands as an option for cashing out the idea of 
issue contexts, it is most commonly associated with a different view, al-
so described as contextualist, which is importantly different to the one 
we are interested in. It will be useful to distinguish these two views. 
According to semantic contextualists like Stewart Cohen (1992) 
and Keith DeRose (1995), (1999), the proposition expressed by sentences 
containing ‘knows’ is what changes with context; effectively the mean-
ing of the word ‘knows’ is different in different contexts. Wittgensteini-
an contextualism does not share this feature; instead the variable that is 
sensitive to context (and so the one which would be determined by the 
relevant alternatives) is the very justificatory status of propositions. 
Semantic contextualist views have a number of problems [as cat-
alogued by Pritchard (2002)] in virtue of their being semantic theories. 
If the relevant alternatives theory were used to supplement the contex-
tualist view that we are developing then it would be important for this 
to stay true to the Wittgensteinian contextualist strategy and not fall 
into the same traps as semantic theses. There may be a way to do this, 
but let’s put this issue to one side and focus on one of the most thor-
ough-going attempts to defend a Wittgensteinian contextualist picture 
of the structure of justification. 
Michael Williams (1991) endorses something equivalent to Witt-
genstein’s Lack of Support and Lack of Doubt claims above, as well 
as the idea of rational evaluation being limited by optimally-certain 
hinge propositions. Like Annis, he adopts a contextualist understand-
ing of the structure of justification, noting that what is ‘optimally-
certain’ (and so what limits evaluation and what counts as an appro-
priate challenge) can vary with context. Also like Annis, Williams is 
interested in the idea of certainty being sensitive to something like the 
‘issues’, or ‘subjects’, with which we are concerned.12 His usual ter-
minology for this thought is that different contexts of inquiry require 
different methodological necessities in order to go ahead. 
Williams typically explains these terms with reference to the 
context in which historical inquiry goes on. Within this context of in-
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quiry some propositions are necessary for the relevant methodology to 
take place: a historian must not question, for example, whether the 
world has really existed for more than five minutes. If she does then 
she is no longer undertaking historical inquiry, and the propositions 
which lack support and doubt for her are not sufficient to draw histori-
cal conclusions from. Instead, she has moved into a sceptical, philo-
sophical context. The proposition that the world has existed for more 
than five minutes is, then, a methodological necessity of a historical 
context of inquiry, but not of a sceptical one. 
In light of this, a clarification of the optimally-certain proposi-
tions that border (or act as ‘hinges’ for) rational evaluation is required. 
Whilst there must always be some propositions held fixed for an en-
quiry to go ahead, it need not be the same propositions each time. We 
shouldn’t think of propositions as existing within a permanent justifi-
catory structure, possessing an inherent, unchanging epistemic status; 
epistemic propriety is sensitive to context. Whilst some hinges must be 
in place in order for the door to turn, the location of the hinges can be 
changed; the door doesn’t always have to turn in the same direction. 
There are other, more controversial features of Williams’ view, 
which I won’t discuss here.13 The important thing to take from his work 
is the sense in which a challenge must be situationally-appropriate. A 
challenge to a proposition that completely undermines the form of in-
quiry the proposition is made within is inappropriate in the strongest 
sense – it prevents the form of inquiry, and thus any justificatory eval-
uations – from going ahead altogether. We now have the basic outline 
for a new view of the structure of justification. I’ll summarise this in 
the next section, before filling in the details in response to an objec-
tion I’ll explain in section 4. 
 
 
III. THE EMERGING PICTURE 
 
As we saw in the introduction, a very general way of characteris-
ing epistemic justification is to say that a belief is justified for a sub-
ject if the basis the subject has for that belief makes it in some way 
epistemically appropriate. We briefly looked at two broad ways of 
cashing out epistemic propriety: subjective rational support, which re-
spected the intuition that a subject should be in some sense able to re-
spond to challenges to her belief; and truth-conducive support, which 
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didn’t require this, and was appealing in making fewer intellectual 
demands of the subject. 
The emerging contextualist picture walks a tightrope between 
these two broad views. It requires that some situationally-appropriate 
subset of challenges to the subject’s belief must be (in some sense) an-
swerable, but it doesn’t make un-intuitively high demands on the sub-
ject because there are other, situationally-inappropriate challenges 
which can be ignored. The key features of this picture are as follows: 
 
1. Justification takes place relative to an epistemic context (where 
an epistemic context is a set of propositions that are used to de-
termine whether or not further propositions are justified). 
 
2. There are limits to these contexts: some optimally-certain 
propositions can’t be questioned or justified (at least within 
the context in question), as characterised by Lack of Doubt 
and Lack of Support. 
 
3. Which propositions are optimally-certain for a particular epis-
temic context depends on something like the methodological 
necessities associated with that context, and so which proposi-
tions can be appropriately challenged (in a particular context) 
is also sensitive to this. 
 
4. Thus, for a proposition P to be justified for a subject S, S must 
be able to answer all and only those challenges which are legit-
imate given (something like) her methodological necessities. 
 
These four claims offer an outline of a Wittgensteinian contextualist 
picture of justification, but the picture is not yet complete. There are ar-
eas that need clarification, and objections that will need to be dealt with. 
One point which should be immediately obvious is that we are 
yet to pin down exactly what determines contexts – at the moment we 
are just relying on the placeholder of ‘(something like) methodologi-
cal necessities’. I mentioned earlier that Annis’ explanation of context 
determiners is wanting. Williams’ account involving methodological 
necessities has been challenged too, by Sarah Wright (2010) who sug-
gests ‘social roles’ as an alternative. Part of the issue here is just to 
spell out a contentious detail which is crucial to the view, and of 
course this is important to do, but more interestingly this will help us 
in responding to a more serious objection in the next section. 
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The problem with Williams’s context determiners is that they 
seem to be dependent on something like our interests, but, as Wright 
points out, these change fairly easily and quickly, whereas the meth-
odologies that we rely upon (and the justification supposed to depend 
on them) don’t. The example Wright gives is of a historian with a 
headache – despite her interests being in the pacification of her head-
ache, and this not being optimised by the painstaking expense of time 
and effort to verify the age of historical documents, the historian’s rig-
orous methodology does not change. Wright concludes from this that 
epistemic contexts are not determined by methodological necessities. 
She goes on to supplement Williams’s view with the idea of ‘so-
cial roles’ which she takes from virtue theory. The key idea is to un-
derstand epistemic propriety in terms of what beliefs are epistemically 
virtuous in the same way that we might understand moral justification, 
or propriety, in terms of what actions are morally virtuous. She argues 
that what is morally virtuous can vary between subjects, depending on 
the roles they have taken on in society; what actions are courageous 
for a civilian witness to a crime will be different to what actions are 
courageous for a police officer in the same situation. Likewise, we can 
cash out the idea of methodological contextualism using social roles; 
what is epistemically appropriate for a doctor to believe on the basis 
of a newspaper article will be different to what is epistemically appro-
priate for someone with no medical training or medical responsibili-
ties to believe. 
Wright integrates this account into the methodological frame-
work very convincingly, and there are a number of subtle ways in 
which the virtue account improves upon methodological contextual-
ism. I don’t think the view is entirely without problems, but it has 
clear merits, and is a definite contender for context determiners. In 
section 5 I will show how scrutinising this account can illuminate the 
way in which Wittgensteinian contextualism should be developed. 
For now, let’s now turn our attention to one of the most pressing 
objections made against Wittgensteinian contextualism: the charge of 
relativism. In section 4 I’ll distinguish two sets of worries that some-
one making this objection could have in mind. I’ll recommend that the 
first set could be allayed by drawing lessons from Stephen Hales’ 
(1997) approach to relativism, and suggest two approaches to respond-
ing to the second set of worries; a general, ‘temerarious’ strategy, 
which I think is promising, but which I don’t have the space to defend 
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fully, and a ‘cautious’ strategy, which I think is less satisfying, but ef-
fective nonetheless. I’ll develop the cautious strategy more fully in 
section 5, drawing on insights from Wright’s virtue account. 
 
 
IV. WITTGENSTEINIAN CONTEXTUALISM AND EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM 
 
The principal objection to Wittgensteinian contextualism is the 
charge of epistemic relativism. This is because the view allows for the 
possibility of two people (or groups) that inhabit entirely different 
contexts with entirely different optimally-certain propositions, and so 
are each entirely justified in believing contradictory propositions. I 
think there are two kinds of worries which this relativist objection is 
grounded in: first, there are worries about whether epistemic relativ-
ism is consistent;
14
 and second, some of the practical reasons we have 
for caring about epistemic justification (such as solving disputes)
15
 
look difficult to solve with a view that allows for contradictions. 
We could, of course, deal with both sets of worries simultaneous-
ly by denying that the view is relativist. Williams took this approach 
in a (2007) paper appropriately titled “Why (Wittgensteinian) Contex-
tualism is not Relativism”. I don’t think this argument is wholly con-
vincing, for reasons that space prevents me elaborating on here, and 
what’s more Williams himself has retracted (in conversation) the con-
clusion of this argument. A refined argument for this conclusion 
would be useful then, but there is a second kind of response to consid-
er too: we could accept that the view is a form of epistemic relativism, 
but deny that this is an objectionable position to hold. 
A number of recent attempts to defend relativism could be helpful 
here, but one which stands out is Steven Hales’ (1997) argument that 
(truth) relativism can be made consistent by likening it to modality. A 
number of features of the relativism which Hales defends are shared by 
the Wittgensteinian contextualism that I describe, and so I think apply-
ing this response to epistemic relativism is a promising option. If we 
can successfully defend a consistent version of epistemic relativism 
then this would deal with the first set of worries mentioned above. 
The second group of worries about epistemic relativism are root-
ed in a meta-philosophical view about what we want from a view of 
justification or, perhaps more accurately, about what features a view 
of justification should have if it is to meet the goals which we want it 
to meet. One possibility, then, is to argue that (at least some of) the 
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goals we have are not goals we should have. Call this the temerarious 
strategy – this is as opposed to a cautious strategy, which would argue 
that the relativist’s worries can be allayed even if we allow the goals 
we have for justification to remain unchanged. 
It’s beyond the scope of this paper to argue for the temerarious 
conclusion, but I think there is reason to be optimistic about the pro-
spects for such a response. In the philosophy of science a contextualist 
view of scientific knowledge has been defended based on the idea that 
there are multiple goals and values to scientific enquiry [Longino 
(1990)]. Further, Intemann (2010) notes that a number of authors have 
gone beyond this, arguing that science should change to reflect these 
multiple goals.
16
 If a similar argument could be made about the aims 
and practices of epistemology, then this would go some way to re-
sponding to the second set of worries about epistemic relativism. Alt-
hough I am tempted by the suggestion that being more liberal about 
our goals would be good for epistemology, I don’t have room to de-
fend such a line in this paper. 
Instead, I will focus on a cautious strategy. Although I find this 
response less satisfying overall, it is still capable of meeting the most 
important issues that arise from the second set of worries about epis-
temic relativism. 
 
 
V. FILLING IN THE DETAILS 
 
In this section I’ll develop a cautious strategy for responding to 
the anti-relativist’s worries, drawing on Wright’s virtue account which 
I discussed above. This cautious response is less general than the tem-
erarious one and so, I think, less satisfying. However, it shows that the 
Wittgensteinian contextualist can avoid these worries even without 
changing the goals of epistemology. I will focus on two specific prob-
lems that arise for an epistemic relativist who shares the current goals 
of epistemology, and argue that the Wittgensteinian contextualist can 
resolve both by making two additions to her view. 
The first problem is that, on a relativist understanding of justifi-
cation, any belief in any proposition can at most be justified relative to 
some context. There can be no ‘extra-contextual’ justification. This 
apparently means that we can’t be (non-circularly) justified in propo-
sitions which make up our own context, and neither can we meaning-
fully criticise (nor praise) propositions which make up other contexts. 
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Take the fundamental propositions of a context in which belief in ho-
meopathy is justified – all those who are anti-homeopathy can say is 
that relative to their anti-homeopathy context they are not justified, 
which is disappointingly trivial. Both of these results make the lack of 
extra-contextual justification which is part of a relativist understand-
ing of Wittgensteinian contextualism look problematic. 
We can deal with this problem by making room for our first addi-
tion to Wittgensteinian contextualism. This is the possibility of over-
lapping contexts; contexts such that subjects can occupy more than 
one at a time. First, let’s look at how this feature is beneficial to 
Wright’s view. 
Generally the examples used to illustrate the idea of contextual 
justification (eg. by Annis or Williams) involve a subject with a sin-
gle, clear epistemic role or methodology (such as a historian who is 
authenticating documents). Although this keeps things usefully sim-
ple, it also glosses over some details which are important to develop-
ing an account of Wittgensteinian contextualism which is immune to 
the anti-relativist’s worries. 
Real subjects are simultaneously embedded in a number of con-
texts, which may be complementary or conflicting. As well as operat-
ing within a context concerned with history, our historian might also 
be a parent, a religious believer, a person with strong political views, 
and have any number of other interests, all of which come with their 
own social roles (according to Wright) or methodological necessities 
(according to Williams). We need to make room for a notion of over-
lapping contexts to reflect this. 
Wright’s account of social roles does this, and it is this feature 
which enables her to stabilise epistemic contexts: as well as occupying 
a context relevant to historical work, the historian occupies other con-
texts with other, conflicting interests, but as her standards for histori-
cal inquiry are set by her historical context, they don’t change with her 
other, non-historical interests. 
How does this help with the problem of the relativist’s lack of 
extra-contextual justification? If a subject can ‘be in’ multiple con-
texts at once then they have a number of sets of propositions at their 
disposal. This means they can question the propositions which make 
up one of their own contexts by partially relying on the propositions of 
other contexts. This opens up the possibility for subjects who are anti-
homeopathy to make meaningful and interesting criticisms about con-
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texts in which homeopathy is justified; as long as there is some con-
text I am in that is shared by supporters of homeopathy too, then I can 
say, if it is true, that some fundamental propositions of the context we 
don’t share are not justified relative to the context that we do share. 
So far, overlapping contexts have proven very useful to the Witt-
gensteinian contextualist: they stabilise epistemic contexts whilst 
making them more realistic, and can also compensate for the absence 
of extra-contextual justification. As we shall see, they can also make 
room for a second general feature of context determiners which helps 
respond to the second of the anti-relativist’s worries. 
The second problem is about the normativity of justification – 
explaining why the sense of epistemic propriety that we settle on gives 
us reason to believe certain propositions over others. In section 3, we 
characterised epistemic justification on the emerging picture as follows: 
 
For a proposition P to be justified for a subject S, S must be able 
to answer all and only those challenges which are legitimate giv-
en (something like) her methodological necessities. 
 
Notice that here justification is a matter of being appropriately related 
to the optimally-certain propositions (however we decide to character-
ise these). The optimally-certain propositions themselves can’t be jus-
tified – they are the measure against which justification happens, and 
can’t themselves be measured. They give us reason to believe the less-
than-optimally-certain propositions then, but what reason do we have 
for believing the optimally-certain propositions? 
It’s important that whatever reasons we have (even if we are usu-
ally not aware of them) are epistemic. It would be easy to show that as 
a matter of practicality some propositions need to be held fixed, and 
that we therefore have pragmatic reasons for our beliefs, but only ep-
istemic reasons will give us the normativity required to allay this first 
concern. Wittgenstein was careful to address this point, emphasising, 
as we have seen, that the limits of rational evaluation are not just de-
scriptive, but are part of the logic of justification. 
Overlapping contexts become useful again here, as they help us 
to make this idea more concrete. By embracing contexts that overlap 
we also open up the possibility of there being contexts which have dif-
ferent levels of scope. In addition to very specific contexts, like those 
involving particular jobs or academic disciplines, we can also think 
Appropriate Belief without Evidence                                                  23 
 
about contexts related to things like membership of a wider communi-
ty (again, I’m taking inspiration here from Wright), or even a broad 
background context which all (or nearly all) epistemic agents occupy 
at all times. 
This supports Wittgenstein’s argument for securing epistemic 
normativity. If the background context is a general epistemic, or ra-
tional, one, then the propositions it requires are needed specifically for 
epistemic evaluation to go ahead. Our reasons for holding these be-
liefs would be more than merely pragmatic, as they would have a spe-
cifically epistemic goal. The optimally-certain propositions are not 
‘justified’ in the sense described above then, but they are clearly epis-
temically appropriate in an important sense. 
By determining contexts in a way which allows them to overlap, 
and incorporates a broad background context, we are able to solve 
multiple problems for the cautious Wittgensteinian contextualist. We 
can stabilise epistemic contexts, provide a space for something func-
tionally equivalent to extra-contextual justification, and secure the 
normativity of contextual justification. 
Of course there is still more to be done. Most pressingly we re-
quire a full defence of the consistency of a relativistic Wittgensteinian 
contextualism. However, I hope the additions I have defended show 
that there is reason to be optimistic about defending a version of Witt-
gensteinian contextualism, and that they will guide any further discus-
sion of the view. In the next section I will briefly make the case for 
committing time and effort to this further discussion by exploring 
some benefits of developing a Wittgensteinian contextualist view of 
justification. 
 
 
VI. APPLICATIONS 
 
Wittgensteinian contextualism is controversial because it in-
volves developing a whole new view of the structure of justification. 
Some intellectual incentive for carrying out this work may be useful 
then. Fortunately, a Wittgensteinian contextualist view of justification 
could have beneficial impacts not just within epistemology, but in 
other areas of philosophy and beyond. 
First, the area of epistemology which Wittgenstein was (purport-
edly) attempting to address: scepticism. The notes in On Certainty can 
be read as an attempt to make sense of the problem with Moore’s 
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‘common sense’ response to scepticism, yet Wittgenstein didn’t ap-
pear to think of the view that emerged as a sceptical one. Since then, 
Williams and others have developed fully-fledged anti-sceptical views 
based on these Wittgensteinian insights.
17
 These authors disagree over 
the details of their views, but there is over-arching agreement that 
some sort of Wittgensteinian contextualism will make headway in 
what is one of the fundamental debates of both historical and contem-
porary epistemology. 
Other areas of epistemology could benefit too. Daniel Greco has 
argued that a Williams/Annis style account of justification could re-
solve tensions between Bayesian accounts of belief updating and ho-
list claims about defeasibility, as well as shedding light on new ways 
to defend epistemological internalism [Greco (MS)]. The right kind of 
Wittgensteinian contextualism has the potential to impact on these de-
bates as well. 
Some of the ways of developing this view which I only gestured 
towards are particularly interesting because of their potential to affect 
debates in social epistemology. Both embracing (consistent) epistemic 
relativism and acknowledging a plurality of epistemic goals could 
provide interesting results in the disagreement debate, as this debate 
centres on how we should react to apparent contradictions. Given the 
wide-ranging impacts of the disagreement debate, if Wittgensteinian 
contextualism can make a difference here it will also have impacts in a 
wide variety of other areas too. It could lead to a fresh perspective on 
the disagreements that philosophers themselves become embroiled in, 
and result in progress within other areas of philosophy, and with the 
meta-philosophical picture of how these debates should be understood. 
Even further afield, outside of philosophy, a proper understand-
ing of what it means for a subject to be justified in her beliefs could 
help with conflict resolution in matters like religion and politics. Orte-
ga has already used his Wittgensteinian thoughts on belief as the basis 
for extensive work on social and political philosophy
18
 and so there is 
a precedent for such a move. 
Clearly there is a wide-ranging set of issues which could be af-
fected by adopting the Wittgensteinian contextualist picture of justifi-
cation which I defend. I hope I have gone someway to showing that 
the costs of developing what is currently a radical, minority view are 
not as great as they may seem, and that the potential benefits of this 
are numerous and important. If so, then we should devote more time 
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to developing a Wittgenstenian contextualist picture of the structure of 
justification, and to refining the idea of epistemically appropriate be-
lief without evidence.  
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NOTES 
 
1
 By epistemic appropriateness I don’t intend to refer to deontological 
justification – this (broad) definition is supposed to be uncontroversial for 
both internalists and externalists. 
2
 For example infallibilists think a belief is only epistemically appropriate 
if it has a conclusive epistemic basis, whereas fallibilists have lower standards. 
3 
On one understanding of internalism the features of epistemic appro-
priateness must be reflectively accessible by the subject, but for the corre-
sponding kind of externalism they don’t. 
4
 For views of justification which could be loosely described as requir-
ing subjective rational support, see Bonjour (1985), Ch.2, Chisholm (1988) 
and Fumerton (1988). 
5
 It may be that the ‘propositions’ in the phrasebook should not really 
be considered to be propositions in the usual sense, since there’s no reason to 
think they refer to any particular train station or any particular town hall. 
However, I think we can ignore this issue; the example makes the point clearly 
enough. 
6
 For example the domain of perceptual beliefs – what reasons can we 
offer for believing that we are experiencing a red thing? If there are reasons 
they are not ones which the majority of people can be expected to adduce. 
7
 Views that might be described in this way include that of Goldman 
(1979), Sosa [Sosa & Bonjour (2003)] and Bergman (2006). 
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8
 I am not the first to present the view as a solution to this problem; Wil-
liams’s paper ‘Responsibility and Reliability’ (2008) takes the same approach. 
9
 See Brandom (1998) on the “default and challenge structure of enti-
tlement”, and Williams’ discussion of the “claimant-challenger asymmetry” 
[Williams (2011), (2013)]. 
10
 Before Annis the main options for a picture of the structure of justifi-
cation were foundationalism and coherentism. The regress argument for scep-
ticism, which goes back to Sextus Empiricus (2000), challenged those who 
thought that justified, rational belief was possible to explain the source of this 
justification. They thought the only options were either (foundational) self-
justifying beliefs, a justificatory loop (which gave rise to coherentism), or an 
infinite chain of new beliefs. The sceptical claim was that none of these is 
satisfactory, and so justification is impossible. Much of epistemology since 
has been devoted to denying this conclusion by making one of the first two 
options look plausible. 
11
 Depending on how situational appropriateness and relevance are 
spelled out there is likely to be a lot of overlap between the challenges which 
these two views considered necessary to respond to, but other details of the 
view, as we will see, are different. 
12
 Sometimes Williams even adopts the name ‘issue contextualism’ for 
his view [Williams (2004); (2007), footnote 2]. 
13
 For a critical discussion of these see Pritchard [forthcomingb]. 
14
 This kind of objection is most commonly made against truth-
relativism, eg. Putnam (1981) and Rorty (1991), but applies similarly to epis-
temic relativism [see Boghossian (2006)]. 
15 
Pritchard (2010) considers this kind of objection (which he refers to 
as a problem about ‘epistemic incommensurability). Interestingly, Hales 
(2014) treats this issue as a way of motivating relativism (though again, this 
is truth relativism not epistemic relativism). 
16
 She refers to Longino (1990), (2002); Anderson (2006); and Solomon 
(2006) who all argue that scientific communities should strive to have more 
diverse enquirers, in response to the diverse aims of scientific enquiry. 
17
 See Crispin Wright (2004) and Pritchard (forthcomingb) 
18
 For a detailed overview of how Ortega’s philosophy and politics re-
late, see Dobson (1989). 
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